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Under Delaware law, corporate officers and directors are bound by two
distinct obligations: fiduciary duties to stockholders as a whole, and
contractual obligations entered into on behalf of the corporation. One species
of contractual obligation is “consent rights,” or limitations on what the
corporation can do without approval from a specified party. Such rights are
commonly granted by corporations in contracts governing loans, joint
ventures, and the issuance of preferred stock.
When a consent rightsholder invokes its ability to block corporate
conduct that management may otherwise believe is in the best interest of the
corporation, management may face a conflict between its obligation to act in
the best interests of stockholders and its obligation to respect the contractual
rights to which the corporation voluntarily agreed. Are there any
circumstances, for example, under which a joint venturer should abandon its
contractual obligations and take action that its fellow partner has
unreasonably refused to approve? At the extreme end of the spectrum, if the
partner is blocking action indisputably in the best interests of the joint
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venture, does that justify breaching the partner’s consent rights—and if so,
how should courts address such a breach? And does it matter if the partner
is clearly using its consent rights to harm the company, thereby holding the
company hostage until it pays an unjustifiably high ransom?
Recent Delaware decisions have suggested that the doctrine of “efficient
breach” may resolve this conflict. Under this theory, a corporation may
breach a party’s consent rights where doing so is in the best interest of
stockholders, with the caveat—recently emphasized by the Delaware
Supreme Court—that the corporation must pay damages to the consent
rightsholder to fully compensate for its loss. The invocation of this doctrine,
however, raises several problems, not the least of which is how those
damages should be calculated. Although Delaware recognizes that rights
may be valued based on a “hypothetical negotiation” for the rightsholders’
consent, there is not a single Delaware case in which a court awarded a
substantial sum of money for the breach of a consent right, despite the high
value that rightsholders tend to attach to these provisions during contract
negotiations. Equally troubling is the difficulty in determining whether a
breach is truly “efficient,” given the reputational harm that may befall a
corporation that breaches its promises to key contractual counterparties like
lenders, partners, and investors.
Like most matters of contract enforcement, these issues are best left to
the bargaining table at the time of contracting—or, failing that, ex post
negotiations between the parties once a dispute has arisen (fostered, if
necessary, through injunctive relief). Absent a negotiated solution, there will
continue to be a conflict between satisfying Delaware’s well-established
policy of enforcing contracts as they are written and the need to prevent a
rogue consent rightsholder from inflicting harm through the misuse of its
contractual privileges. In general, courts should not attempt to resolve this
conflict by protecting companies that breach a consent rightsholder’s
interests under the “efficient breach” doctrine, as the difficulty of assessing
damages ex post creates a substantial danger that any monetary remedy
would be insufficient to satisfy the rightsholder’s reasonable expectations
that the protections it negotiated would be strictly enforced under Delaware
law. Instead, courts should more readily look to equitable remedies to force
the parties back to the bargaining table.
I. THE NATURE OF CONSENT RIGHTS
In Delaware, a corporation’s board of directors generally has the sole
authority to make decisions on behalf of a corporation. Consent rights, which
are alternatively referred to as “approval rights,” “protective provisions,”
“blocking rights,” or “veto rights,” chip away at this exclusive authority by
vesting the right to approve or veto certain decisions with a third party (such
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as a lender, business partner, or group of stockholders). In essence, consent
rights are a form of restrictive covenants that enable a contracting party to
control certain corporate actions. Consent rights may be held by a single
party, or they may be subject to the vote of a collective group (such as a class
of investors). When they are controlled by a single party or a small, closely
associated group of entities, consent rights can create substantial power to
dictate corporate behavior.1 Conversely, when they are diffuse among a large
group of unrelated rightsholders, the corporation has more leverage to obtain
the groups’ approval.2
A. Common Types of Consent Rights
Consent rights are common features in at least three distinct types of
contracts:3
i. Loan Agreements: Corporate debt lenders typically include a
substantial number of restrictions designed to protect their right to
repayment. The consent rights set forth in these documents frequently
require that a borrower obtain the lender’s approval to take on new debt or
restructure the loan, engage in certain transfers, and issue new equity, and
may also place restrictions on how loaned funds are to be used.4

1. See generally Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Do Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond
Covenant Changes?, 66 J. BUS. 499 (1993); id. at 512–13 (where bondholders with consent rights
form coalitions, they modify consent terms and “realize some of the gains expected from covenant
modifications”).
2. Id. at 500 (when bondholders with consent rights cannot coordinate, they “will consent to
covenant changes even when it is not in their collective interest to do so”).
3. Of course, there are various types of consent rights, broadly defined, in many other types
of documents. For example, bond instruments often contain restrictive covenants “that are thought
to prevent stockholder expropriation of bondholder wealth, for example, covenants that restrict a
company’s ability to pay dividends, to incur additional debt, to engage in transactions with a
controlling shareholder, or to sell assets without forcing the purchaser to assume the company’s
obligations with respect to the bonds.” Kahan, supra note 1, at 500. When corporations look to
remove these restrictions, they frequently do so by issuing consent solicitations to groups of
bondholders at large. Id.; see also Steve V. Mann & Eric A. Powers, Determinants of Bond Tender
Premiums and the Percentage Tendered, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 547, 549 n.4. (2007) (“Consent
solicitations can be stand-alone (which is relatively uncommon) or included with a tender offer or
exchange offer . . . .”). However, because bonds are typically diffusely held, corporations’ attempts
to seek to modify the “consent rights” contained therein often involve an offer to the public rather
than the type of one-on-one negotiations described throughout this Article. See Kahan, supra note
1, at 502. For this reason, this Article omits further mention of the somewhat unique circumstances
of consent rights contained in bond offerings.
4. See, e.g., Fletcher Int’l Ltd. v. ION Geophysical Corp., No. 5109-CS, 2013 WL 6327997,
at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2013) (describing creditor approval rights associated with a $100 million
credit facility); Timothy Davis, Steven Coury & Carlos Piñeiro, Key Provisions to Focus on When
Negotiating Senior/Subordinate Co-Lender Agreements, WHITE & WILLIAMS LLP (2018),
https://www.whiteandwilliams.com/resources-alerts-Key-Provisions-to-Focus-on-WhenNegotiating-Senior-Subordinate-Co-Lender-Agreements.html.
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ii. Joint Venture Agreements: When two companies form a joint
venture, it is natural that each venturer will wish to have measure of control
over key decisions by the jointly formed corporation.5 Joint venture
agreements typically vest managerial control over day-to-day activities in
either one of the two partners or a third-party manager, but grant each of the
individual corporate entities the power to veto major decisions.6 In recent
years, Delaware courts have addressed the unique problems that arise when
one party has the ability to “lock up” corporate operations by exercising its
veto rights to prevent the company from engaging in operations necessary to
its survival.7 In rare cases, courts will resolve true lock-up by dissolving or
forcing a sale of the corporate entity.8
iii. Preferred Stock Certificates: Perhaps the most commonly analyzed
type of consent rights are those that are associated with the issuance of
preferred stock, as preferred stockholders’ contractual rights create the
possibility of a sharp divergence between the interests of preferred and
common stockholders.9 Generally, venture capitalists make investments

5. See generally Minority Protections in Joint Ventures, THOMPSON REUTERS: PRAC. L.,
https://us.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/Document/Id72c5839916511e79bef99c0ee06c731/Vie
w/FullText.html. I use the term “joint venture” here to refer to a structure in which both participants
have roughly equal bargaining power (although perhaps unequal stakes), and thus have the ability
to negotiate beneficial consent rights for themselves.
6. See, e.g., Glidepath Ltd. v. Beumer Corp., No. 12220-VCL, 2019 WL 855660 at *6–7, 11–
12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2019). Glidepath involved an LLC operating agreement which required a
supermajority member approval for actions including “dissolving the Company, amending its
certificate of formation, changing the legal form of the company, and admitting new members,” and
written approval of a simple majority of members for actions including the admission or removal of
management, capital expenditures above $10,000, contracts above $3,000,000, and any “material
deviation from the Business Plan.” Id. at *5–6.
7. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 273(a) (1953) (permitting dissolution of a joint venture if two
50-50 owners are deadlocked); Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 154 (Del. 2017) (affirming the
appointment of a custodian to sell a “hopelessly deadlocked” corporation). The unique problems
created by the use of consent rights in a joint venture are not the focus of this Article because such
joint ventures are less likely to have a broad base of common shareholders to whom the joint
venturers would owe a fiduciary duty.
8. See, e.g., Elting, 157 A.3d at 154–55 (affirming the Court of Chancery’s judgment that “the
circumstances of the case required the appointment of a custodian to sell the company”).
9. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 49 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“The cash flow rights
of typical VC preferred stock cause the economic incentives of its holders to diverge from those of
the common stockholders.”) (citing William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1815, 1832 (2013)); Sarath Sanga & Eric Talley, Don’t Go Chasing Waterfalls: Fiduciary Duties in
Venture Capital Backed Startups 1 (Oct. 31, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3721814 (stating that companies backed by
venture capitalists who own preferred stock can be “crucibles of conflict”). This is particularly true
because preferred stock generally comes with a liquidation preference over common stock, meaning
that preferred shareholders are often entitled to receive both repayment of their initial purchase price
and any accrued dividends before common stockholders receive any money in a liquidation or other
event that yields a change of control. Trados, 73 A.3d at at 47–50; see generally D. Gordon Smith,
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through the purchase of preferred stock accompanied by a set of consent
rights, commonly referred to collectively as “protective provisions.”10 Each
set of consent rights associated with an issuance of preferred stock is typically
“highly negotiated” and then incorporated into a certificate of designations.11
“[T]hese provisions seek to protect the investment of the preferred
stockholders from actions by the company that may dilute or diminish their
investment” and must be strictly construed.12 Common consent rights in this
context include the right for a majority of the preferred stockholders to
approve: (i) major corporate actions such as a merger, dissolution, IPO, or
sale: (ii) the issuance of equity and incurrence of debt; (iii) changes to the
business plan or major projects; and/or (iv) the compensation and termination
of executive officers.13 One less common but potentially powerful right is a
stockholder redemption right, which “allow[s] [i]nvestors to force the
[c]ompany to redeem their shares” for a set price.14 While “redemption rights
are not often used,” they “do provide a form of exit and some possible
leverage over the [c]ompany.”15 Conversely, while many certificates of
designations include a “no impairment” provision stating that the “company
will not take any action that would impair the rights, powers, and preferences
The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 339 (2005) (noting that preferred
shareholders’ liquidation preference includes “the original issue price of the preferred stock”).
10. ANDREW METRICK & AYAKO YASUDA, VENTURE CAPITAL & THE FINANCE OF
INNOVATION 150 (2d. ed. 2011) (“VCs typically purchase some form of preferred stock.”)
(emphasis omitted); Smith, supra note 9, at 339; C. Stephen Bigler & Jennifer Veet Barrett, Words
that Matter: Considerations in Drafting Preferred Stock Provisions, 2014 BUS. L. TODAY 1, 2
(2014); see also Trados, 73 A.3d at 48 n.22 (“When investing in the United States, VCs almost
exclusively use preferred stock.”).
11. See Bigler & Barrett, supra note 10, at 2 (“Among the most highly negotiated contractual
provisions related to preferred stock are the so-called ‘protective provisions,’ which are contained
in the certificate of incorporation and set forth a list of actions that the company cannot take without
the prior consent of a specified percentage of the outstanding preferred stock.”); see also Edward
Ackerman & Angelo Bonvino, Preferred-Stock Minority Investments in the Private Equity Context,
LEXIS PRAC. ADVISOR J. at 1–4 (2017), https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3977420/
bonvinoackerman_5oct2017.pdf; Smith, supra note 9, at 338–40 (noting that investors lacking
board control “typically seek more targeted protection” during contract negotiations). Although
less common, in addition to certificates of designations, preferred consent rights could theoretically
appear in articles of incorporation, registration rights agreement, investor rights agreement, and/or
stockholder agreements. See MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn, No. 4521-CC, 2010 WL 1782271, at
*6–7 & n.31 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2010) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (a), (f) (2017) (noting
that for corporations, the rights of preferred stock shall be set forth or summarized on the stock
certificate but may also appear in certificates of incorporation or corporate board resolutions); see
also Searchlight CST, L.P. v. MediaMath Holdings, Inc., No. 2020-0652-SG, 2020 WL 5758023,
at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2020) (noting that an investor rights agreement executed in connection
with the purchase of preferred stock created “certain limitations on the Defendant’s freedom of
action”).
12. Bigler & Barrett, supra note 10, at 3.
13. Ackerman & Bonvino, supra note 11, at 7–8.
14. METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 10, at 474 n.11.
15. Id.
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of the holders of the company’s existing preferred stock,” this provision is
generally of limited value.16 That is because courts have ruled that each
consent right must be expressly set forth in the certificate or applicable
document, and a “no impairment” provision cannot act as a “gap filler” to
imply the existence of rights that were omitted.17 Commentators have noted
that the allocation of consent rights between preferred investors and a target
corporation is important because these rights provide each side with key
points of control in the management of the corporation.18
B. Judicial Enforcement of Consent Rights
Courts have consistently found that consent rights should be enforced
as they are drafted, and that parties may use their contractual rights to approve
or veto corporate action if they determine that doing so is in their “best
interests.”19 This view is in keeping with Delaware’s “especially strong
principle” that the parties’ contractual bargain must be enforced according to
its express terms.20 As the Delaware Supreme Court held, “A party does not
act in bad faith by relying on contract provisions for which that party
bargained where doing so simply limits advantages to another party. We
cannot reform a contract because enforcement of the contract as written
would raise ‘moral questions.’”21 Thus, when a party holds a set of consent
16. Bigler & Barrett, supra note 10, at 3.
17. Id. (citing WatchMark Corp. v. ARGO Global Capital, LLC, No. Civ.A 711-N, 2004 WL
2694894 (Del. Ch. Nov. 4, 2004)).
18. Thomas Hellmann, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts, 29
RAND J. ECON. 57, 60 (1998) (consent rights “matter either because they allow one party to make a
decision in the presence of conflict of interest or because they affect the threat points in any
renegotiation”).
19. See Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, No. 5001-VCS, 2010 WL 2929708, at
*6 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010) (holding that defendant was entitled to use its consent rights in its “best
interests”); In re MONY Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 683 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(“Stockholders of Delaware corporations have the right to vote their shares in their own interest.”);
Miller v. Am. Real Estate Partners, L.P., No. CIV.A.16788, 2001 WL 1045643, at *13 n.35 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 6, 2001) (“Under Delaware corporation law, . . . a stockholder is entitled to vote its shares
in its own self-interest.”).
20. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347, at *60 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (“The proper way to allocate risks in a contract is through bargaining between
parties. It is not the court’s role to rewrite the contract between sophisticated market participants,
allocating the risk of an agreement after the fact, to suit the court’s sense of equity or fairness.”
(citation omitted)), aff’d, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018); NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica Inc., 997 A.2d
1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“Delaware upholds the freedom of contract and enforces as a matter of
fundamental public policy the voluntary agreements of sophisticated parties.”); Pers. Decisions, Inc.
v. Bus. Planning Sys., Inc., No. 3213-VCS, 2008 WL 1932404, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2008)
(“Delaware is a freedom of contract state, with a policy of enforcing the voluntary agreements of
sophisticated parties in commerce.”), aff’d, 970 A.2d 256 (Del. 2009).
21. Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1128 (Del. 2010). Interestingly, in Nemec it was the
corporation that held a freestanding right to redeem former officer and directors’ stock at book value
after the expiration of a two-year period. Id. at 1123. The corporation chose to exercise this right
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rights, it does not violate a duty to other stockholders “by exercising those
rights as it wishe[s].”22
Parties arguing otherwise have generally failed to find traction in
Delaware courts. For example, in Superior Vision Services, Inc. v. ReliaStar
Life Insurance Co.,23 ReliaStar, a shareholder with a 44% stake in the plaintiff
company, had the ability to block all dividend payments (which required
consent from two-thirds of all shareholders).24 Over the course of a year, the
plaintiff tried three times to issue a dividend, and ReliaStar initially refused
to consent each time—allegedly in accordance with its “practice to withhold
its consent to dividends in order to strong-arm individual stockholders or
SVS to further its own agenda.”25 For the first dividend, ReliaStar relented
and gave its consent only after a shareholder owning 32% of the outstanding
stock promised to support a sale of the company.26 ReliaStar refused to
consent to the Board’s next two attempts to pay dividends, prompting the
company to seek a declaratory judgment that it was permitted to issue
dividends, and that by wrongfully withholding its consent, ReliaStar
breached its fiduciary duties and its duty of good faith and fair dealing.27
Vice Chancellor Noble had little difficulty dismissing the complaint.28 With
respect to the “remarkably unconventional” argument that ReliaStar
“breached its fiduciary duties by, among other things, withholding its consent
to the payment of dividends without any economic justification or other bona
fide reason,” Vice Chancellor Noble held that a shareholder owes no
fiduciary duties merely because it “exercises a duly-obtained contractual
right that somehow limits or restricts the actions that a corporation otherwise
would take.”29 The court also easily rejected the argument that ReliaStar
one month before closing the multi-billion dollar sale of a major line of business, thereby depriving
the plaintiffs of approximately $60 million that they would have received had the redemption
occurred after the sale. Id. at 1124–25. Because the corporation was contractually entitled to
redeem the stock during this period, the court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of the
case, stating that the corporation’s “directors did nothing unfair and breached no fiduciary duty by
causing the Company to exercise its absolute contractual right to redeem the retired stockholders’
shares at a time that was most advantageous to the Company’s working stockholders.” Id. at 1127.
22. Ford v. VMware, Inc., No. 11714-VCL, 2017 WL 1684089, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2017).
23. No. Civ.A. 1668-N, 2006 WL 2521426 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2006).
24. Id. at *1.
25. Id. at *1.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *2.
28. Id. at *7.
29. Id. at *3–5. The court left open the possibility, however, that fiduciary duties could arise
under the “controlling shareholder” doctrine “where the holding of contractual rights [was] coupled
with a significant equity position and other factors.” Id. at *5. If a consent rightsholder is deemed
a controller, it has fiduciary duties and the analysis changes considerably regarding how it can use
its contractual rights. Recent case law suggests that this exception may have begun to swallow the
rule. For example, Vice Chancellor Slights recently applied this rule to permit a case to survive a
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breached any implied good faith obligation, given that the contract “place[d]
no express limitation on ReliaStar’s discretion.”30 Without an explicit
condition that consent could not be unreasonably withheld, the court declined
to “read a reasonableness requirement into a contract entered into by two
sophisticated parties.”31 Such a result was required under Delaware law, the
court held: “It is imperative that contracting parties know that a court will
enforce a contract’s clear terms and will not judicially alter their bargain, so
courts do not trump the freedom of contract lightly.”32
Four years later, in Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC,33 a
plaintiff again brought implied covenant and breach of fiduciary duty claims
against an LLC member that refused to consent to certain “major decisions”
in connection with the development of property in Colorado.34 Then-Vice
Chancellor Strine dismissed the complaint, again emphasizing that Delaware
courts must enforce contracts according to their express terms: “Delaware
motion to dismiss where the complaint alleged that the minority members of a limited-liability
company used their consent rights (called “blocking rights”) to “drive [the LLC] into bankruptcy,
and then pounced on the opportunity to acquire [the LLC]’s valuable assets on the cheap when they
came up for sale as part of the debtor’s bankruptcy plan.” Skye Mineral Inv’rs, LLC v. DXS Capital
(U.S.), Ltd., No. 2018-0059-JRS, 2020 WL 881544, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2020). The court
agreed with the general principle that merely having a consent right did not transform the minority
members into controllers with attendant fiduciary duties, but held that the complaint alleged more:
specifically, that the members also engaged “in a concerted effort” to place the company “in a
precarious financial condition” before exercising their “unilateral power” to force a shutdown. Id.
at *27; see also Voigt v. Metcalf, No. 2018-0828-JTL, 2020 WL 614999, at *1–2, 19 (Del. Ch. Feb.
10, 2020) (denying a motion to dismiss because it was “reasonably conceivable” that a private equity
firm with 34.8% of a company’s voting rights and substantial board representation was a controller
with fiduciary duties, noting that its wide range of contractual veto rights “weigh[ed] in favor of an
inference that [the fund] exercised control over the Company generally by giving [the fund] power
over the Company beyond what the holder of a mathematical majority of the voting power ordinarily
could wield”). While this exception appears to be increasingly important, for the purposes of this
Article I assume that the consent rightsholder does not have other attributes that would render it a
controlling stockholder.
30. Superior Vision Servs., Inc., 2006 WL 2521426, at *5.
31. Id. at *6 (quoting Gildor v. Optical Solutions, Inc., No. 1416-N, 2006 WL 1596678, at *7
n.17 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2006)).
32. Id.
33. No. 5001-VCS, 2010 WL 2929708 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010).
34. Id. at *1, 5. The “major decisions” included the right to: “‘approve or disapprove the annual
Business Plan, the annual proposed budget update or . . . any amendment or modification of the
Business Plan then in effect or any amendment to the Approved Budget then in effect to the extent
that such action would constitute a Material Action;’ ‘‘“make expenditures on behalf of the LLC[s]
or its subsidiaries to the extent such expenditures would constitute a Material Action;’ ‘incur, place,
replace, renew, extend, substitute, add to, supplement, amend, modify, increase, restructure or
refinance any borrowing by the LLC[s] or [their] subsidiaries . . . or to negotiate or enter into any
binding agreement to do any of the foregoing’ unless the borrowing is ‘incurred in the ordinary
course of business’ and ‘less than $50,000;’” and “‘amend, modify, or deviate from, the Business
Plan or the Approved Budget of the LLC in a manner which would constitute a Material Action.’”
Id. at *2–3 (alterations in original) (quoting Complaint at Exhibit B §§ 6.3.1–6.3.13, Related
Westpac, 2010 WL 2929708).
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law respects the freedom of parties in commerce to strike bargains and honors
and enforces those bargains as plainly written.”35 Because the plaintiff had
“clearly relinquished any reasonableness condition to [defendant’s] consent
right as to future business plans and budgets” when the parties were “[a]t the
bargaining table,”36 Vice Chancellor Strine concluded:
Under the plain terms of the operating agreements, the defendant
member had bargained for the right to give consents to decisions involving
material actions or not, as its own commercial interests dictated. Having
bargained for that freedom and gained that concession from the operating
member, the defendant member is entitled to the benefit of its bargain and
the operating member cannot attempt to have the court write in a
reasonableness condition that the operating member gave up.37
As these cases make clear, Delaware courts’ robust policy of enforcing
contracts as written extends to the invocation of consent rights, even when
the party using its consent rights is presumed to be doing so unreasonably or
unfairly.38
This strong judicial enforcement of consent rights has important public
policy implications. Consent rights are frequently negotiated as a material
component of contracts that allow a corporation to raise capital, and investors
therefore rely on these provisions in making decisions about whether to
invest capital into a corporation. As Vice Chancellor Balick noted in the
context of consent rights in certificates of designation for preferred stock,
“[i]f there were no protections, investors would be afraid to take the risk. If
corporations are able to market preferred stock, investors have to be able to
rely on protections when they are expressed with reasonable clarity.”39 Thus,

35. Id. at *6.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *1; see also id. at *8 (“Under the Operating Agreements, JER Snowmass was left free
to give consents to Major Decisions involving Major Actions as it chose, in its own commercial
interest. That freedom was not qualified by any fiduciary duty of so-called ‘reasonableness’ and to
imply such a duty in these circumstances would nullify the parties’ express bargain.”).
38. See also Thermopylae Capital Partners, L.P. v. Simbol, Inc., No. 10619-VCG, 2016 WL
368170, at *13–14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2016) (rejecting the argument that a preferred stockholder
became a fiduciary obligated to act in the best interest of the company due to its “blocking rights”
because “an individual who owns a contractual right, and who exploits that right—even in a way
that forces a reaction by a corporation—is simply exercising his own property rights, not that of
others, and is no fiduciary”); PWP Xerion Holdings III LLC v. Red Leaf Res., Inc., No. 2017-0235JTL, 2019 WL 5424778, at *16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2019) (granting summary judgment to enforce
preferred stockholder’s consent rights, stating, “Stockholders in Delaware corporations have a right
to control and vote their shares in their own interest . . . . It is not objectionable that their motives
may be for personal profit, or determined by whim or caprice, so long as they violate no duty owed
other shareholders.” (quoting Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987))).
39. Matheson v. Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 14900, 1996 WL 33167234, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr.
8, 1996).
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without the assurance that consent rights would be enforced by Delaware
courts, the ability of corporations to secure capital would be at risk.40
On the other hand, courts’ refusal to recognize any good faith or
“reasonableness” check on the use of consent rights means that parties are
free to abuse those rights to hold a company hostage until its demands are
met—even where those demands are wholly untethered from the issue for
which consent is sought. It is understandable why a company, when faced
with such onerous circumstances, would look for an escape hatch.
II. UNDER DELAWARE LAW, MANAGEMENT HAS NO FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATION TO ABIDE BY A COMPANY’S CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS
Meanwhile, Delaware has been developing a separate body of law
exploring what happens when a party’s contractual rights create a potential
conflict with director and officers’ fiduciary obligations to the corporation
and its common shareholders. While the former line of cases emphasizes the
importance of contractual consent rights, these cases highlight managements’
countervailing fiduciary duties—which in some circumstances, at least,
would seem to open up the possibility that management should breach
contractual consent rights so long as it serves the best interests of the
corporation as a whole. It is worth noting that this potential approval of a
corporation’s decision to violate its contractual obligations is starkly at odds
with Delaware’s treatment of a corporation that violates statutory or
regulatory law, which is prohibited in all circumstances no matter how
beneficial such a violation might be for the corporation.41
Chancellor Allen previewed the possibility of efficient breach in Orban
v. Field,42 a case brought by common stockholders who received nothing in
a corporate merger because the amount owed to the preferred stockholders
was greater than the total merger consideration.43 The plaintiffs alleged that
the board had “exercised corporate power against the common and in favor
of the preferred and, thus, breached a duty of loyalty to the common” by
helping preferred stockholders “overcome a practical power that the common

40. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 48–49 (Del. Ch. 2013); Smith, supra note 9,
at 319–20, 346–47.
41. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[O]ne cannot act loyally
as a corporate director by causing the corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged to obey.”
(citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1953) (barring a corporation from exculpating directors
for personal liability for breaches of fiduciary duty based on, inter alia, “a knowing violation of
law”)).
42. No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997).
43. Id. at *1.
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held to impede the closing of the merger.”44 The court rejected this argument,
finding that the board’s conduct satisfied the applicable fairness standard.45
In so doing, the court recognized the doctrine of efficient breach as a “fact of
legal life,”46 but held that it would be “bizarre” to use it to find that the board
had a duty to the common stockholders to breach “the corporation’s legal
obligations to its other classes of voting securities.”47
More recently, courts—led by Vice Chancellor Laster—have been more
willing to recognize the possibility that fiduciary duties may create an
obligation to breach a company’s contractual obligations to preferred
shareholders. The seminal case discussing fiduciary obligations when a
conflict arises between the interests of preferred and common shareholders
is Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion in In re Trados Inc. Shareholder
Litigation48 Prior to Trados, there was uncertainty as to “whether a fiduciary
duty should be owed in a particular situation to the preferred stockholders, or
whether their rights should be limited to their contractual rights.”49 Much ink
has been spilled regarding the implications of the Trados decision, which
need not be repeated here.50 For the purposes of this Article, it suffices to
say that Trados reaffirmed that “the rights and preferences of preferred stock
are contractual in nature,”51 and consequentially, “[p]referred stockholders
are owed fiduciary duties only when they do not invoke their special
contractual rights and rely on a right shared equally with the common
44. Id. The board allowed plaintiffs’ common stock to be diluted by preferred shareholders
exercising their warrants, thereby preventing the plaintiff stockholders from holding sufficient
shares to block the merger. Id. at *8.
45. Id. at *9.
46. Id. (“Certainly in some circumstances a board may elect (subject to the corporation’s
answering in contract damages) to repudiate a contractual obligation where to do so provides a net
benefit to the corporation. To do so may in some situations be socially efficient.”) (citing Richard
Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
629 (1988)); see also Merck & Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Pharm. Co., No. C.A. 15443-NC, 1999
WL 669354, at *51 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 1999), aff’d mem., 746 A.2d 277 (Del. 2000), and aff’d, 766
A.2d 442 (Del. 2000) (“Our courts have recognized, even if only by implication, that in appropriate
circumstances breach of contract is justified and efficient.”) (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 445 (Del. 1995)).
47. Orban, 1997 WL 153831, at *9.
48. 73 A.3d 17, 35–36 (Del. Ch. 2013).
49. Marilyn B. Cane, Joong-Sik Choi & Scott B. Gitterman, Recent Developments Concerning
Preferred Stockholder Rights under Delaware Law, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 377, 382 (2011).
50. See, e.g., Adam M. Katz, Addressing the Harm to Common Stockholders in Trados and
Nine Systems, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 234, 234 (2018) (Trados “involved the peculiar
corporate law equivalent of a burglary in which nothing was stolen”); Abraham J.B.
Cable, Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 51, 57 (2015)
(“Trados is an important case, but one that should be invoked sparingly.”); Lisa R. Stark, SideStepping Fiduciary Issues in Negotiating Exit Strategies for Preferred Stock Investments After
Trados, 2013 BUS. L. TODAY 1 (2013).
51. Trados, 73 A.3d at 39 (quoting In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig. (Trados I), No. 1512-CC,
2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009)).

106

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:95

stock.”52 The principle that emanates from this rule is that directors must
“maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its residual
claimants, the ultimate beneficiaries of the firm’s value, not for the benefit of
its contractual claimants.”53 While prior case law had stated that directors
are bound “to pursue the best interests of the corporation and its common
stockholders, if that can be done faithfully with the contractual promises
owed to the preferred,”54 Trados went a step further and stated that a director
could potentially breach its fiduciary obligations by favoring the preferred’s
contractual rights at the expense of common stockholders.55 Despite this
warning shot, however, the court ultimately ruled that the board did not
violate its fiduciary duties by approving the sale at issue—in which common
stockholders ended up with nothing—because the company “did not have a
reasonable prospect of generating value for the common stock.”56
Vice Chancellor Laster faced another preferred-common rift four years
later in Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding. Corp.57 There, the
founder of a California corporation called Oversee.net sued a venture
capitalist that had invested $150 million in exchange for preferred shares in
ODN Holding Corporation (“ODN”), a holding company for Oversee.net.58
The preferred shares carried a redemption right after five years if the
company had “legally available funds” to redeem the stock.59 ODN was
contractually obligated to “take all reasonable actions (as determined by the
[Company’s] Board of Directors in good faith and consistent with its
fiduciary duties) to generate, as promptly as practicable, sufficient legally
available funds to redeem all outstanding shares of [Preferred Stock].”60 The
founder alleged, however, that the ODN board had violated its fiduciary
obligations by harming the long-term prospects of the company by
maximizing the redemption of preferred stock.61 Vice Chancellor Laster
52. Id. at 39–40.
53. Id. at 40–41.
54. Id. at 41 (quoting LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 452 (Del. Ch.
2010)) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 41–42; see also Bigler, supra note 10, at 3–4 (citing In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig.,
73 A.3d 17, 49 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“If there is a divergence of interests between the holders of the
preferred stock and common stock in a sale because, for example, all of the sale proceeds would go
to the preferred stock and none of it would reach the common stock, it will generally be the duty of
the board of directors to prefer the interests of the common stockholders to those of the preferred
stockholders. In fact, directors could breach their fiduciary duties if they favor the interests of the
preferred stockholders under these circumstances.”).
56. Trados, 73 A.3d at 76–78.
57. No. 12108-VCL, 2017 WL 1437308, at *23–24 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2017).
58. Id. at *1.
59. Id. at *1, 6.
60. Id. at *4 (alterations in original).
61. Id. at *5. Although both Trados and ODN assume that venture capitalists are excessively
interested in short-term returns, potentially to the detriment of common stockholders’ long-term
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denied ODN’s motion to dismiss, rejecting the preferred stockholders’
argument that ODN’s contractual obligations meant that “the corporation had
an obligation to fulfill its contractual commitment”:62
It is true that the fiduciary status of directors does not give them
Houdini-like powers to escape from valid contracts . . . . But the
fact that a corporation is bound by its valid contractual obligations
does not mean that a board does not owe fiduciary duties when
considering how to handle those contractual obligations; it rather
means that the directors must evaluate the corporation’s
alternatives in a world where the contract is binding. Even with an
iron-clad contractual obligation, there remains room for fiduciary
discretion because of the doctrine of efficient breach. Under that
doctrine, a party to a contract may decide that its most
advantageous course is to breach and pay damages. Just like any
other decision maker, a board of directors may choose to breach if
the benefits (broadly conceived) exceed the costs (again broadly
conceived).63
If breaching a contract may be in the best interest of all stockholders,
then, there exists a “corollary” principle that “directors who choose to comply
with a contract when it would be value-maximizing (broadly conceived) to
breach could be subject, in theory, to a claim for breach of duty.”64
Understandably, Vice Chancellor Laster’s decision in ODN triggered a
number of alarmist articles warning preferred stockholders that their
contractual rights may not be as secure as they had previously believed.65
Various law firms issued practitioner notes recommending that attorneys
negotiating the purchase of preferred stock take additional precautions to
interests, others have written that “[a] growing literature in behavioral finance and psychology now
provides sound reasons to conclude that corporate managers often fall prey to long-term bias—
excessive optimism about their own long-term projects” to which venture capitalists “can provide a
symbiotic counter-ballast.” Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Long-Term Bias (ECGI Working Paper
Series in Law, Paper No. 449, 2019).
62. ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *23.
63. Id. at *23–24.
64. Id. at *24. Following ODN, Vice Chancellor Laster issued an opinion in Glidepath Ltd. v.
Beumer Corp. extending these core principles to decide whether the buyer of an LLC breached its
fiduciary duty to the seller, who remained a member of the LLC, when it operated the company in
a way that prevented the seller from obtaining an additional earn-out payment. No. 12220-VCL,
2019 WL 855660 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2019). In holding that the buyers did not violate any duty to
the sellers, Vice Chancellor reiterated the principle that management does not owe any special duty
to contractual rightsholders, and “a fiduciary violates the standard of conduct if the fiduciary seeks
to maximize the value of a contractual claim at the expense of the fiduciary’s beneficiaries.” Id. at
*19. The only duty owed by management is “to act in good faith to maximize the value of the
Company over the long term” and, therefore, there is “no fiduciary obligation to protect the value
of a contractual claim.” Id. at *20–21.
65. See, e.g., Thompson Hine LLP, Let the Buyer (of Preferred Stock) Beware, LEXOLOGY
(June 26, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=925ca358-fb5b-4087-b213322e767c637a.
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“safeguard their preferred status,” such as ensuring the inclusion of
“cumulative dividends, favorably priced conversion options of the preferred
stock to common stock, automatic issuance of common stock or even a
mandatory sale of the company.”66 Other options might include the creation
of a liquidated damages clause for any breach,67 or, more appropriately for a
joint venture agreement, adding other onerous consequences like a default
provision with a forced buy-sell mechanism (whereby the breaching party
risks losing its investment entirely if it does not cure the breach). The purpose
of such provisions would “be to put a thumb on the scale in favor of honoring
the privileges associated with its preferred status. Making it more painful for
a board to breach contractual obligations increases the likelihood that the
preferred stockholder’s preferences will be upheld, thereby providing greater
protection from loss.”68 In addition to strengthening contractually negotiated
rights, practitioners also recommended considering whether investment
capital would be better placed in mezzanine debt or some other investment
structure rather than preferred stock to avoid the uncertainty surrounding
stockholder consent rights created in the wake of Trados and to ensure the
parties’ contractual agreements would be enforced as written by removing
them from the realm of shareholder rights.69
Many scholars have been similarly critical of the treatment of preferred
stockholders in both Trados and ODN.70 Notwithstanding this criticism,
66. Id.
67. Liquidated damages provisions are enforceable under Delaware law where they are not
intended to act as a “punishment for default” but instead represent “the parties’ best guess of the
amount of injury that would be sustained in a contractual breach, a way of rendering certain and
definite damages which would otherwise be uncertain or not easily susceptible of proof.” S.H.
Deliveries v. TriState Courier & Carriage Inc., No. 96C–02–086–WTQ, 1997 WL 817883, at *2
(Del. Super. Ct. May 21, 1997). They are permissible where (i) damages are uncertain or incapable
of accurate calculation, and (ii) the specified amount is reasonable. Del. Bay Surgical Servs., P.C.
v. Swier, 900 A.2d 646, 651 (Del. 2006) (citing Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 48 (Del.
1997)). Given the inherent difficulty of valuing consent rights, as set forth in this article, it appears
that the first part of this test would generally be satisfied in most cases involving the breach of a
consent right.
68. Thompson Hine LLP, supra note 65.
69. Benet J. O’Reilly et al., Between Contractual and Fiduciary Duties: ODN Holding and the
Rights of Preferred Stockholders, CLEARY M&A AND CORP. GOVERNANCE WATCH (June 8, 2017),
https://www.clearymawatch.com/2017/06/contractual-fiduciary-duties-odn-holding-rightspreferred-stockholders/.
70. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Means to an End,
38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 256 (2015) (critiquing Trados as advocating an approach that would
“seem to require as a matter of complying with directors’ fiduciary duties the type of reckless, gofor-broke gambles known to plague leveraged firms nearing financial distress”); Elizabeth Pollman,
Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 190–91 (2019) (“Corporate law scholars have pointed
out that this interpretation [in Trados and ODN] can give rise to inefficient outcomes that fail to
maximize aggregate welfare. Consequently, they argue for an understanding of fiduciary duty that
requires directors to maximize the aggregate value of all classes of equity—otherwise stated as firm
value—without regard to its allocation.”); Sanga & Talley, supra note 9, at 4 (“[C]ourts can more
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Delaware courts have continued to state the rule that a “board can readily
comply with its fiduciary duties while making a decision that breaches a
contract, just as a board could opt to comply with a contract under
circumstances where its fiduciary duties would call for engaging in efficient
breach.”71 Under the legal analysis that continues to prevail in Delaware,
then, the fact that a company is bound by certain contractual obligations is
completely divorced from the question of whether the company acted in
accordance with its fiduciary obligations to all stockholders.
III. SHOULD CONSENT RIGHTS BE “EFFICIENTLY” BREACHED?
What are we to make of these two parallel strains on law? On one hand,
Delaware law promises investors that its courts will enforce a corporation’s
contractual obligations as the parties negotiated them, but on the other, it tells
preferred stockholders that the corporation is free to breach those same
contractual obligations so long as doing so benefits other stockholders.
Under Delaware’s prevailing standard, if a company refrains from taking
action to benefit common stockholders in order to respect its preferred
investors’ contractual rights, it appears that courts will not assume that its
decision to abide by its contract was appropriate—even though investors
undoubtedly expect that the corporation will honor their rights in the normal
course of business. Such an expectation is especially reasonable given that
corporations are strictly prohibited from violating positive laws,72 and it is
not immediately apparent why contractual obligations should be treated
differently from other types of legal obligations. Indeed, if investors believed
the corporation was free to breach its contractual obligations at will, it is
difficult to imagine that they would make an investment at all.73 This state
of affairs is all the more unusual because it seems to undermine the
longstanding rule that “Delaware respects ‘the primacy of contract law over

effectively induce value-maximizing decisions through an ‘anti Trados’ rule that grants primacy to
preferred shareholders (rather than common). This result stands in stark contrast to the Trados
doctrine, which mandates the opposite approach and ultimately achieves less”).
71. PWP Xerion Holdings III LLC v. Red Leaf Res., Inc., No. 2017-0235-JTL, 2019 WL
5424778, at *15 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2019) (citing Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp.,
No. 12108-VCL, 2017 WL 1437308, at *24 (Del. Ch. 2017)).
72. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
73. The counterargument, of course, is that investors—who are often sophisticated parties aided
by legal counsel—already understand that any contractual rights they negotiate can be breached by
the company so long as the company later pays damages. The relative scarcity of case law assessing
damages for the breach of a consent right, however, suggests that this path is rarely followed so
investors would have no reason to anticipate it (and no ability to accurately predict damages). See
infra text accompanying notes 79–84.
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fiduciary law in matters involving . . . contractual rights and obligations.’”74
For that reason, courts generally refuse to create a fiduciary obligation
inconsistent with a party’s contractual rights.75 But if contract law is
supreme, how can a corporation legitimately disregard its contractual
obligations in favor of fulfilling its fiduciary duties?
If these legal doctrines are to be meaningfully reconciled with respect
to the enforcement of consent rights, it must be done through the remedies
that flow from a breach of such rights. I address the issues of damages and
injunctive relief in turn, along with other consequences that must be
considered in determining whether a breach is truly “efficient.” In short,
given that consent rights are difficult to value and the breach of a contract
with key investors, lenders, or other counterparties is likely to have wideranging repercussions, courts should strongly consider using injunctive relief
to enforce consent rights. Once a company is ordered to refrain from acting
without the rightsholder’s consent, the power balance in negotiations for that
party’s consent shifts from the company to the rightsholder—which is
precisely what the parties would have expected when they negotiated their
respective contractual rights.
A. Calculating Damages for Breach of a Consent Right
Like all contractual breaches, the usual method for calculating damages
for the breach of a consent right is based on the non-breaching party’s
expectation interest—that is, “an amount that will give the injured party ‘the
benefit of its bargain by putting that party in the position it would have been
but for the breach.’”76 “The primary element of expectation damages is the
[sic] ‘the value that the performance would have had to the injured party,’ or
the ‘loss in value’ caused by the deficient performance compared to what had
been expected.”77 In the context of a consent right breach, expectation
damages can be calculated based on (i) the actual harm caused by the breach,

74. Marubeni Spar One, LLC v. Williams Field Servs. – Gulf Coast Co., L.P., No. 2018-0908SG, 2020 WL 64761, at *10 n.95 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 2020) (quoting Renco Grp., Inc. v. MacAndrews
AMG Holdings LLC, No. 7668-VCN, 2015 WL 394011, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2015)).
75. See Norton v. K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P., 67 A.3d 354, 362 (Del. 2013) (holding that the
general partner could have no fiduciary duties regarding its merger approval where the contract gave
it “sole discretion” to “consent to a merger”); Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, No.
5001-VCS, 2010 WL 2929708, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010) (“When a fiduciary duty claim is
plainly inconsistent with the contractual bargain struck by parties to an . . . alternative entity
agreement, the fiduciary duty claim must fall . . . .”).
76. Leaf Invenergy Co. v. Invenergy Renewables LLC, 210 A.3d 688, 695 (Del. 2019) (quoting
Genencor Int’l, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 766 A.2d 8, 11 (Del. 2000)).
77. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981)).
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or (ii) the amount that the rightsholder could have obtained for its consent in
a hypothetical negotiation.78
Unfortunately, consent rights have proven notoriously difficult to value.
Litigants are rarely able to show the “actual harm” caused by the breach,
given the intangible nature of the right and the fact that breaches frequently
occur when a company is in some type of distress—thereby making it
difficult to prove that the breach, rather than other circumstances, was the
cause of the harm.79
That leaves only a second form of expectation damages, which may be
“calculated based on the expected outcome of a hypothetical negotiation
between these parties before” the decision to breach.80 As then-Chancellor
Strine acknowledged in Fletcher v. ION81 in 2013, this is “an exercise in
counterfactual historical imagination that is, by its very nature, fraught with
uncertainty.”82 To determine the likely path of a hypothetical negotiation, a
court must begin by considering “which parties would have been involved in
the hypothetical negotiation and what leverage those parties would have
had.”83 Then, a court must determine, “using its best effort, how the
hypothetical negotiation likely would have ended.”84
This analysis did not go particularly well for the Fletcher plaintiff, who
alone held the right to consent to a $40 million bridge financing that was a
minor portion of a much larger transaction.85 Chancellor Strine held that the
plaintiff lacked sufficient leverage to extract a large value for his consent due
to several factors, including the need for other lenders to approve any consent
payment to him and the fact that the defendant “could have structured the
transaction to avoid implicating the Fletcher plaintiff’s consent right.”86 The
court suggested that it would be skeptical of any consent rightsholder who
“viewed its consent right as an opportunity to coerce value from” a
78. Leaf Invenergy Co. v. Invenergy Wind LLC, No. 11830-VCL, 2018 WL 1882746, at *26,
31 (Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2018), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Invenergy Renewables LLC, 210
A.3d at 695; Fletcher Int’l, Ltd. v. Ion Geophysical Corp., No. 5109-CS, 2013 WL 6327997, at *11
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2013).
79. See, e.g., Fletcher, 2013 WL 6327997, at *11; Zimmerman v. Crothall, 62 A.3d 676, 716
(Del. Ch. 2013) (holding plaintiff suffered no actual damages from defendants’ contractual breach
of awarding only nominal damages of $1).
80. Fletcher, 2013 WL 6327997, at *18; see also Cedarview Opportunities Master Fund, L.P.
v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., No. 2017-0785-AGB, 2018 WL 4057012, at *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27,
2018) (noting that “money damages in the form of a hypothetical consent fee could remedy a proven
breach”) (quoting Def.’s Opening Br. at 43-44, Cedarview Opportunities Master Fund, L.P, 2018
WL 4057012 at *1).
81. No. 5109-CS, 2013 WL 6327997 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2013).
82. Id. at *19.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *1.
86. Id. at *2.
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corporation, even for a transaction that “was highly beneficial to” the
rightsholder.87 Chancellor Strine further noted that in a prior consent rights
case, Zimmerman v. Crothall,88 the plaintiff had “learned a lesson about
overplaying one’s hand” after the court awarded it only nominal damages for
the breach of a consent right that benefited the plaintiff.89
Thus, Fletcher provided the “reasonableness” check for damages
stemming from the use of consent rights that courts refused to apply in cases
like Superior Vision and Related Westpac when addressing the existence of
a breach.90 While a party can be as unreasonable as it wishes in refusing to
grant consent, the party assumes the risk that the corporation can simply
breach the contract and—if the rightsholder cannot prove it was harmed—
pay nothing. With those guidelines in place, the parties are presumably
encouraged to work to find a negotiated solution without court intervention.
However, a consent rightsholder’s leverage in such a negotiation is
undermined by uncertainty surrounding a potential future damages award.
As explained below, the availability of equitable relief (in the form of a
temporary injunction or specific performance) would bring a rightsholder’s
leverage in these negotiations more in line with the parties’ expectations at
the time of contracting, particularly where that consent is required to move
forward with a corporate action highly desired by the company.
In the end, the Fletcher plaintiff was awarded a meager $300,000, far
less than the multimillion dollar “king’s ransom” that he had sought.91 What
is more remarkable is that this appears to be the highest amount of damages
ever awarded under a “hypothetical negotiation” framework, which is
admittedly seldom used.92 It is possible that when parties have sufficient
leverage to extract large concessions or payments for their consent, they do
not need a court’s help to do so; it is equally possible that corporations
generally respect consent rights and do not often breach them (at least when
the rightsholder would be likely to seek judicial intervention). Regardless of
the reason, the absence of any substantial damages awards as measured by a
“hypothetical negotiation” suggests that this measure of damages may be
more theoretical than practical.
The difficulty in valuing consent rights is further shown by Vice
Chancellor Laster’s initial decision in Leaf Invenergy Co. v. Invenergy Wind

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at *18.
62 A.3d 676 (Del. Ch. 2013).
Fletcher, 2013 WL 6327997, at *18.
See supra Section I.B.
Id. at *2, *26.
See supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text.
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LLC,93 which awarded only nominal damages for the breach of a preferred
investors’ right to approve a certain type of sale.94 Although the parties’
contract provided that the sale would trigger a premium payment to the
investor calculated according to a contractual formula (which totaled $126
million), Vice Chancellor Laster found that the company had engaged in an
“efficient breach” and a hypothetical negotiation would have yielded no
payment in light of the company’s other options and the “lack of any financial
pressure.”95 Thus, instead of awarding the plaintiff the $126 million that it
had expected, the court awarded the plaintiff a single dollar.96
The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed, acknowledging the concept
of “efficient breach” but clarifying that the doctrine “does not bar recovery
or modify damages calculations in any way . . . . [E]fficient breach does not
allow the breaching party to bypass the usual method of calculating
damages.”97 It was similarly an error to attempt to reconstruct a hypothetical
negotiation, the Court held, because the contract clearly specified the amount
owed to the plaintiff.98 The Court awarded the plaintiff the full $126
million.99 Thus, while the Supreme Court of Delaware ultimately awarded
significant damages, it did so based on the functional equivalent of a
liquidated damages provision—not a hypothetical negotiation.100 And if
anything, this case further underscores how difficult it is to predict the
amount of damages that a court will award for a defendant’s breach of the
plaintiff’s consent right.
In short, while it is intuitively appealing to value consent rights based
on what a hypothetical counterparty would pay for them, the “hypothetical
negotiation” test has proved to be a failed experiment.
B. Availability of Equitable Relief
There are two potential equitable remedies that can effectively force the
parties to engage in a negotiation to obtain the rightsholder’s consent: (i) a
preliminary injunction, which depending on the speed necessary for the
desired corporate action may resolve the case entirely; and (ii) the remedy of
specific performance, awarded after the court issues a final decision on the
merits, which would bar further corporate action without consent. Each form
93.
2019).
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

No. 11830-VCL, 2018 WL 1882746 (Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2018), rev’d, 210 A.3d 688 (Del.
Id. at *33.
Id. at *31–32.
Id. at *38.
Leaf Invenergy Co. v. Invenergy Renewables LLC, 210 A.3d 688, 703 (Del. 2019).
Id. at 703–04.
Id. at 694, 704.
See supra text accompanying note 66.
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of relief is considered to be an “extraordinary remedy” that is to be “granted
sparingly.”101 Before granting both remedies, courts are required to engage
in a balancing of the equities between the parties and to determine whether
monetary damages are instead sufficient (and reasonably ascertainable) to
remedy any harm.102 While courts have traditionally favored awarding
monetary damages whenever possible, recent scholarship demonstrates that
in one of the most common scenarios—where common stockholders breach
preferred stockholders’ consent rights by wrongfully continuing a company
that preferred stockholders wish to liquidate—no amount of money can
efficiently compensate preferred stockholders for this breach.103
Courts have cautioned that “[t]he preliminary injunction ‘burden is not
a light one,’”104 and that the remedy of specific performance “is a matter of
grace and not of right.”105 But what if both forms of equitable relief were
more readily available to prevent the breach of one party’s consent right? If
courts were more willing to grant injunctions or order specific performance
to enforce consent rights, it would force the parties to negotiate a resolution
(by either obtaining consent or foregoing the desired corporate action). This
result would obviate the need for courts to engage in a post hoc recreation of
a negotiation that did not occur.

101. Renco Grp., Inc. v. MacAndrews AMG Holdings LLC, No. 7668-VCN, 2013 WL 3369318,
at *12 n.97 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2013) (“The granting of a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
remedy.”) (citing DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, CORPORATE AND
COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY § 10.02(a), at 10–5 (2012)); W.
Willow-Bay Court, LLC v. Robino-Bay Court Plaza, LLC, No. 2742-VCN, 2007 WL 3317551, at
*12 (Del. Ch. Nov. 2, 2007), aff’d, 985 A.2d 391 (Del. 2009) (“Specific performance is an
extraordinary remedy, appropriate where assessing money damages would be impracticable or
would fail to do complete justice.”).
102. C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Empls.’ & Sanitation Empls.’ Ret. Tr., 107
A.3d 1049, 1066 (Del. 2014) (“To obtain a preliminary injunction, the [petitioner] must
demonstrate: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) that they will suffer
irreparable injury without an injunction; and (3) that their harm without an injunction outweighs the
harm to the defendants that will result from the injunction.”); Sarissa Cap. Domestic Fund LP v.
Innoviva, Inc., No. 2017-0309-JRS, 2017 WL 6209597, at *26 (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 2017) (“A party
seeking specific performance must prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the existence of a
valid, enforceable contract; (2) the ‘essential elements’ of that contract; and (3) the absence of an
adequate legal remedy. The party seeking relief must also establish that it is ‘ready, willing and
able to perform’ its contractual obligations, and that the ‘the balance of the equities’ . . . favor[s]
granting specific performance.’”) (first quoting Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153,
1158 (Del. 2010); then quoting Robino-Bay, 2007 WL 3317551, at *13).
103. Sanga & Talley, supra note 9 , at 23–24. Sanga and Talley’s model demonstrates that the
ability to engage in an efficient breach varies depending on who controls the decisionmaking
process for the company. Where common control the ability to decide whether to liquidate a
company, under the legal rule set forth in Trados, “efficient damages do not exist.” Id. at 24.
104. Protech Sols., Inc. v. Delaware Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 2017-0642-TMR,
2017 WL 5903357, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2017) (quoting Wayne Cty. Empls.’ Ret. Sys. v. Corti,
954 A.2d 319, 329 (Del. Ch. 2008)).
105. Robino-Bay, 2007 WL 3317551, at *12.
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Despite the difficulties inherent in calculating damages described above,
courts have varied in their willingness to enjoin breaches of consent rights.
For example, in Fletcher, the consent rightsholder sought a preliminary
injunction to prevent the ION from issuing the $40 million loan in violation
of its right to consent to the issuance.106 Vice Chancellor Parsons denied the
application, holding that the threat of injury was not irreparable but was
instead compensable with damages.107 Later, following the trial, thenChancellor Strine applied the hypothetical negotiation test to award damages,
but suggested that injunctive relief should have been granted in the first
instance because “consent rights cases are better dealt with by injunctive
relief if the court can act with alacrity and give the parties a reasonable period
to have the negotiation or work around the consent rights.”108 In other words,
why try to reconstruct a “hypothetical negotiation” if you could enter an
injunction and force an actual negotiation?
Nonetheless, courts have not fully adopted this view and continue to
maintain a reluctance to issue injunctions in support of consent rights. More
recently, in Tinicum Capital Partners II, L.P. v. Liberman Broadcasting,
Inc.,109 Vice Chancellor Laster considered the plaintiff’s motion to
preliminarily enjoin the defendant company from violating a contractual
provision that prevented it from entering into binding transactions related to
a spectrum auction by the FCC scheduled to start on March 29, 2016.110
Under the parties’ agreement, the plaintiff was permitted the “absolute
discretion” to “withhold or deny” its consent.111 On March 17, 2016—twelve
days before the auction was to start—the court denied the motion, holding
that the need for consent could be delayed until June and the parties could
complete arbitration by that time.112 The court noted, however, that if there
had been “a more imminent risk of decisions that could implicate the Consent
Rights,” then an injunction may have been appropriate.113
This scattered state of the law has left litigants confused about whether
or not it is possible to obtain an injunction to secure consent rights. The
Invenergy plaintiff, for example, stated that he “believed that Leaf could not
obtain an injunction because a court would hold that Leaf could receive

106. Fletcher Int’l, Ltd. v. Ion Geophysical Corp., No. 5109-CS, 2013 WL 6327997, at *11 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 4, 2013).
107. Id.
108. Id. at *19.
109. No. 11902-VCL, 2016 WL 1070480 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 2016).
110. Id. at *1.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *2.
113. Id.
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money damages as a remedy.”114 While there are undoubtedly circumstances
where such relief is not warranted based on a consent rightsholder’s
inequitable conduct, courts’ overriding reluctance to award equitable
remedies is misguided in light of the difficulties inherent in calculating
damages for a breach after the fact.115
C. A Company’s Inability to “Efficiently” Breach a Contract Is Less
Important Given the Ancillary Consequences of a Breach
One consequence of a court’s increased willingness to grant injunctive
relief or specific performance to enforce a consent provision is that a
company’s ability to engage in an “efficient breach” of that provision would
be severely curtailed. That is, if the consent rightsholder can obtain a court
order enjoining the breach before it occurs, then a breach carries more
onerous consequences than simply paying damages after the fact. Willfully
disobeying a court order would almost inevitably result in the imposition of
sanctions, which under Delaware law can range from penalty payments, to
the admission of certain facts, to a default judgment.116 At the most extreme,
it could potentially lead to the cancellation of the entities’ incorporation or
formation documents.117 Under these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine
how one could efficiently breach a party’s consent rights if that party is able
to obtain an injunction to prevent it.
But how significant is the loss of a company’s ability to breach a consent
right? A discussion of the inherent difficulty of determining what constitutes
an “efficient breach” would be incomplete if it did not consider the many
indirect consequences of a breach. Even where a breach of consent rights
would seem to make sense from an economic perspective, hard-to-predict
costs and the intangible consequences of a breach mean that it is rarely, if
ever, truly the most efficient path forward, at least when those consent rights
are held by key investors or joint venture partners.

114. Leaf Invenergy Co. v. Invenergy Wind LLC, No. 11830-VCL, 2018 WL 1882746, at *22
(Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2018), rev’d, 210 A.3d 688 (Del. 2019).
115. See supra Sections III.A–B.
116. See, e.g., Terramar Retail Ctrs., LLC v. Marion #2-Seaport Tr. U/A/D June 21, 2002, No.
12875-VCL, 2018 WL 6331622, at *11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2018).
117. In 2018 and 2019, Delaware enacted statutory law giving the state Attorney General the
power to file proceedings to cancel or revoke an entities’ formative documents where the entity has
engaged in the “abuse” or “misuse” of its powers. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 284(a) (1953)
(corporations); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-112(a) (2018) (LLCs); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17112 (2019) (partnerships). In the first year since these rules’ enactment, the Attorney General has
been sparing in their use, filing just six forfeiture actions against fifteen entities in 2019. See Denis
Demblowski, Analysis: Can Delaware Cancel My Company?, BLOOMBERG L. ANALYSIS (Jan. 17,
2020),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-can-delaware-cancelmy-company.

2020]

NOT WITHOUT CONSENT

117

As others have mentioned, “expectation damages as awarded in law
often fall short of a truly compensatory measure due to the exclusion of such
items as attorneys’ fees, unmeasurable subjective losses, and ‘unforeseeable’
damages.”118 This problem is worse in high-stakes commercial litigation,
where legal fees can soar into the millions. Moreover, because the ultimate
remedy that a court will award is uncertain,119 a breaching party can easily
end up worse off by paying substantial money for lawyers while also paying
out damages that equal or exceed the amount that it would have cost simply
to obtain the necessary consent.120 Some scholars have also pointed out that
although “the received wisdom is that contract remedies do not exist to
punish a breaching party,” in reality, often the remedies awarded by courts
are harsher where the breaching party acted willfully.121 A finding of
willfulness also opens up the possibility that a breaching party will be ordered
to pay the nonbreaching party’s legal fees, which “may be awarded if it is
shown that the defendant’s conduct forced the plaintiff to file suit to secure a
clearly defined and established right.”122
Moreover, particularly salient in the context of investment capital,
breaching a party’s contractual consent rights can have substantial
reputational consequences that may impact the corporation’s ability to
conduct future business.123 As studies have shown, once a market participant
is known to “cheat,” “it becomes common knowledge that the person lacks
integrity” and their reputation is damaged.124 In other words, “the notion of
a reputation is intimately tied to the concept of breach. A party loses its
reputation for performance or for trustworthiness whenever they breach an
agreement.“125 Because contract disputes frequently become public through
a corporation’s litigation disclosures, court filings, media attention, industry
gossip, or other means, it is unreasonable to think that the market of investors
or potential joint venturers would not learn about the breach of another

118. Craswell, supra note 46, at 637.
119. See supra Sections III.A–B.
120. Craswell, supra note 46, at 638 (“Since so many contract remedies depart in one direction
or the other from the ‘ideal’ of perfect compensation, the prospect of inefficient breaches (or the
deterrence of efficient breaches) would seem to loom large.”).
121. Marco J. Jimenez, Retribution in Contract Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 637, 643 (2018).
122. Carlson v. Hallinan, 925 A.2d 506, 545 (Del. Ch. 2006) (awarding fees for refusal to
recognize director’s entitlement to corporate records) (quoting McGowan v. Empress Entm’t Inc.,
791 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. Ch. 2000)).
123. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J. L. & ECON.
691, 693 (1983). See generally W. Bentley MacLeod, Reputations, Relationships and the
Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts (IZA, Discussion Paper, Paper No. 1978, 2006),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=885347.
124. MacLeod, supra note 123 at 30–31 (citing ROBERT WILSON, Reputation in Games and
Markets, in GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGANING 27-62 (Alvin E. Roth Ed., 1985).
125. Id. at 32.
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party’s consent rights. For an early-stage company seeking investment
capital, this loss of reputation might well be fatal. Few investors would be
comfortable relying on the contractual rights they negotiate with a
corporation if they knew that the corporation was willing to breach its
contractual obligations to previous investors.
IV. A PATH FORWARD
Thus, while courts have consistently floated the possibility of an
“efficient breach” of a party’s consent rights, the reality of breaching such
rights is far more onerous than is contemplated in those decisions. Moreover,
the full consequences of a breach are difficult to predict, making it impossible
to determine at the time of breach whether that breach is in fact “efficient.”
In light of all these considerations, the idea that a board could breach its
fiduciary duty by honoring a party’s consent rights seems merely theoretical
(at best). Corporations should generally respect consent rights not for some
moralistic purpose, but because it is generally in the best interests of all
stockholders to preserve the company’s reputation and ability to seek out
future capital.
More broadly, the tension between the strict enforcement of contractual
rights and courts’ willingness to accept that breach of those rights may be
advisable (and free to the breaching party) can be resolved through the
creation of a default rule that, in the usual course of business, consent rights
are appropriately enforced with equitable relief. The use of injunctions to
protect a party’s right to consent would be consistent with courts’ treatment
of other forms of restrictive covenants, including those commonly found in
employment agreements. For example, in enforcing classic restrictive
covenants like noncompete and non-solicitation agreements, Delaware courts
“use injunctive relief as the principal tool of enforcing covenants not to
compete.”126 Similarly, much of the investor uncertainty and difficulty
surrounding the enforcement of consent rights could be resolved simply by
the adoption of this rule. While the ability to efficiently breach a contract
would be effectively lost, Delaware courts’ protection of bargained-for
contractual rights through injunctive relief would send the same signal to
potential investors as does their adherence to enforcing the plain terms of
contractual language—that is, a signal that investor rights will be respected
and enforced in Delaware.
Moreover, the issuance of a temporary injunction or the award of
specific performance forces the parties back to the bargaining table to have a
126. Concord Steel, Inc. v. Wilmington Steel Processing Co., No. 3369-VCP, 2008 WL 902406,
at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2008) (quoting Hough Assocs. v. Hill, No. Civ. A. 2385-N, 2007 WL
148751, *18 (Jan. 17, 2007)).
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real negotiation. A court is then relieved of having to reimagine a
“hypothetical negotiation” that, by definition, failed in reality (since the
parties ended up coming to court to resolve their dispute) and that requires a
court to engage in precisely the type of “speculation” and “conjecture” that
Delaware courts typically reject as a basis on which to award monetary
damages.127 Instead, courts need only enjoin the breach of contract, and the
parties can work out an optimal solution based on their own interests.
Moreover, because the issuance of an injunction or specific performance
requires a balancing of the equities,128 the involvement of courts at this stage
can also help mitigate the “hostage” problem, as the court has discretion to
decline to act where necessary to prevent particularly grievous harm to the
corporation. This procedure would have the additional benefit of insulating
the corporation against a breach of fiduciary duty claim stemming from its
recognition of contractual rights, as a corporation cannot possibly breach its
fiduciary obligations by complying with a court order forcing it to abide by
those same contractual obligations.
Absent a greater judicial willingness to grant equitable relief, the current
uncertainty will persist and consent rightsholders may not be as protected as
they would have expected at the time of contracting. Given the current state
of the law, where possible, parties negotiating consent rights should create
enforceable consequences for a breach. On the flip side, a company can
protect itself from improper hostage-taking by rightsholders by specifying
that consent may not be unreasonably withheld. Until the parties can be
confident that Delaware courts will adequately protect both a party’s consent
rights alongside the rights of the corporation, these protective measures are
necessary to ensure that the parties’ reasonable expectations about their
contractual rights are fulfilled.

127. See OptimisCorp v. Waite, 137 A.3d 970, 2016 WL 2585871, at *3 n.11 (Del.
2016) (“[W]hen acting as the fact finder, [the Court of Chancery] may not set damages based on
mere ‘speculation or conjecture’ where a plaintiff fails to adequately prove damages.”) (alterations
in original) (quoting Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 613 (Del. Ch. 2010)).
128. N.K.S. Distribs, Inc. v. Tigani, 2010 WL 2367669, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 7, 2010); but see In
re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P., No. C.A 14634, 2000 WL 130629, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27,
2000) (finding that “the equities heavily favor the plaintiffs” who “raised colorable claims about the
defendant’s conduct” which was “precisely the conduct that the Agreement sought to prevent”).

